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MANDATORY ARBITRATION:
WHY IT'S BETTER THAN IT LOOKS
TheodoreJ. St. Antoine*
"Mandatory arbitration" as used here means that employees must agree as a condi-
tion of employment to arbitrate all legal disputes with their employer, including
statutory claims, rather than take them to court. The Supreme Court has upheld the
validity of such agreements on the grounds that they merely provide for a change of
forum and not a loss of substantive rights. Opponents contend this wrongfully de-
prives employees of the right to a jury trial and other statutory procedural benefits.
Various empirical studies indicate, however, that employees similarly situated do
about as well in arbitration as in court actions, or even better, although successful
plaintiffs get larger monetary awards in court. Perhaps most important as a practi-
cal matter, lower-paid employees generally cannot get access to court while they can
secure a hearing in arbitration. For most such workers, arbitration may be the only
realistic option. This Article will conclude that the primary concern should be to en-
sure due process in mandatory arbitration. That would mean guarantees such as a
mutually selected arbitrator, no broad prohibition of class actions, a fair hearing
reasonable costs, and the same remedies as provided by any applicable law.
INTRODUCTION
Employers were doubly vexed by employment-law developments
in the 1980s. First, a series of court decisions, which would eventu-
ally embrace all but a couple of states,' imposed significant
qualifications on the traditional American common-law doctrine of
"employment at will." Under that doctrine, as chillingly described
in a classic Nineteenth Century case, employers may lawfully "dis-
miss their employees at will ... for good cause, for no cause or
even for cause morally wrong."2 The exceptions that were carved
out, with increasing frequency during the 1980s, were based on
such theories as public policy (a tort)," implied contract, 4 and,
* James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan.
1. 9A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 505:51 (2004) (Louisiana and Rhode Island were the
holdouts).
2. Payne v. W. & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). See also HORACE G.
WOOD, LAW O MASTER AND SERVANT 272-73 (1877).
3. SeeTamenyv. Ad. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee refused to join
price-fixing conspiracy); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980)
(whistleblower); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981) (whistleblower).
Contra Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (whistleblower).
4. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (oral com-
mitment to employee when hiring); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292
N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (oral commitment to employee when hiring); Woolley v.
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much less often, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As it
turned out, however, careful employers could avoid most of the
adverse effects of these new legal developments by sensible behav-
ior, contractual disclaimers, and even by the revocation of prior
promises through reasonable notice to the work force]
The second blow to employers during this period was the award
by judges and juries of substantial damages to employees who were
found to be victims of wrongful discharge. For example, several
studies showed that plaintiffs in California won about 75% of the
discharge cases that went to juries, with the average award being
around $450,000.8 Nationwide, single individuals during that pe-
riod received jury awards for actual and punitive damages for
wrongful discharge as high as $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 mil-
lion, $2.57 million, $2 million, and $1.5 million.9 Even winning was
not cost-free for business. By the end of the 1980s the fees and ex-
penses for a successful defense of a discharge case before a jury
could range between $100,000 and $150,000 in major Midwestern
cities, and amount to around $200,000 on the coasts.' °
One widespread employer reaction to these dual developments
of new causes of action and costly litigation was to impose so-called
"mandatory arbitration." To get or keep a job, employees must
agree to arbitrate all legal disputes with their employer rather than
take them to court. This would apply even to claims arising under
federal or state civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (policy statement in personnel manual);
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982) (policy statement in personnel
manual; reliance is also a factor).
5. See Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Buysse v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Minnesota law);
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). Contra Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 86.
6. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Michigan
law); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 1995) (unambiguous
disclaimer effective despite placement on last page of 53-page handbook). But cf Jones v.
Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989) (one-sentence disclaimer in 85-page
manual ineffective as unclear and inconspicuous).
7. See In ir Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich.
1989). But cf. Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 682 N.E.2d 68 (I1. App. Ct. 1997) (12-year-old
commitment could not be revoked without employee's consent).
8. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATION 24-26, 33-37 (1988); Clifford Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litiga-
tion: "Dagwood" and Goliath, 62 MICH. B.J. 776 (1983); California Wrongful Discharge Verdicts
Averaged $424,527 in 1986Jury Trials, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 24,1987, at A-4 to A-5.
9. Kenneth Lopatka & Julia Martin, Developments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge, in
ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND INVASION OF PRIVACY
CLAIMS vii, 13-18 (1986).
10. Conversations between author and management attorneys at 1992 midwinter
meeting of the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section's Committee on Individual Rights
and Responsibilities in the Workplace on April 8-9, 1992.
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against employees because of race, sex, religion, ethnicity, age, dis-
ability, and so on." Mandatory arbitration, as its description alone
should indicate, raises a host of legal and policy questions, espe-
cially with regard to the attempted prevention of resort to the
courts for the vindication of statutory rights.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the pros and cons of
mandatory arbitration in both theory and practice. Special empha-
sis will be placed upon the various empirical studies that have
attempted to show how such arbitration has actually operated. Al-
though the focus of this Article will be upon arbitration in
employment, one should note that mandatory arbitration has also
proliferated in a variety of other contexts, including retail sales,
medical situations, and financial dealings. In certain respects the
position of an employee subject to an arbitration agreement may
be quite different from that of other people bound by similar ar-
rangements, such as the individual consumer or medical patient.
Nonetheless, some of the findings in employment may have
broader applications, or at least pose questions that require con-
sideration in other areas.
I. LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
In two cases decided almost two decades apart, the Supreme
Court took quite different positions-some might reasonably argue
perversely different positions-on employment arbitration. In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 2 the Court held an arbitrator's
11. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117,
12201-12213 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). A number of state statutes and municipal ordinances
extend the protected categories beyond the federal coverage. Thus, employment discrimi-
nation may be prohibited because of marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, HIV
or AIDS, and genetic testing. 8A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) FEPM 451:1-5, 451:51-53 (2003,
2005, 2007).
12. 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974). See also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S.
728, 745 (1981) (employees not barred by arbitration award on wage claim under union
contract from suing under the Fair Labor Standards Act). In Gardner-Denver, the Court noted
that the arbitrator's award could be admitted in evidence in subsequent court proceedings,
and, if certain procedural safeguards were observed, it could be accorded "great weight."
415 U.S. at 60 n.21. Cf Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131-32 (2001) (Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, i., dissenting). Technically, Circuit City merely held that the
Federal Arbitration Act exempts only the contracts of transportation workers from its broad
provision for the judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements. Id. at 119. But the reality
was a confirmation of Gilmers endorsement of mandatory arbitration. Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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adverse decision under a collective bargaining agreement did not
prevent a black employee from pursuing a claim in court that his
discharge was based on racial discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that
the arbitrator was only authorized to decide the contractual issue
of discrimination, and not the statutory issue.13 But in Gilmer v. In-
terstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 4 the Court held that an individual
stockbroker employee was bound by a contract with the New York
Stock Exchange to arbitrate a claim of age discrimination against
his employer. The Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on the
grounds that in Gilmer the arbitrator was authorized to handle
statutory as well as contractual disputes.15 The earlier case was also
said to involve a "tension" between union representation and indi-
vidual statutory rights. 6 Furthermore, the Court stressed that no
loss of statutory rights occurred in Gilmer. It was only a change of
forum. 7 And the arbitral procedures must be such that they would
not impair the employee's capacity to vindicate statutory rights.1
8
Even so, the Court noted that the stockbroker was not precluded
from filing a charge with the EEOC; only his court action was
barred.19
The Court's emphasis on the difference in the authority of the
arbitrators in Gardner-Denver and Gilmer will matter little if unions
and employers can simply empower arbitrators in the labor con-
tract to deal with statutory issues. But in Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp.,21 the Court held that any union-negotiated waiver of
employees' statutory rights to a judicial forum for claims of em-
ployment discrimination would have to be "clear and
unmistakable." In terms of bargaining power, one can argue that a
union's agreement to arbitrate and waive the judicial forum should
be more acceptable-less of a contract of adhesion-than an iso-
lated individual employee's agreement. Moreover, any concern
that a labor organization might treat an employee's civil rights
cavalierly should be tempered by the existence of the well-
13. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53-54.
14. 500 U.S. 20, 23-27 (1991) (arbitration agreement not contrary to policy of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and enforceable under Federal Arbitration Act).
15. Id. at 34.
16. Id. at 35.
17. Id. at 26-28.
18. Id. at 28, 30-32.
19. Id. at 28. The Court has since held that an individual's agreement to arbitrate em-
ployment disputes does not preclude the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief in court,
including reinstatement, back pay, and damages. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 296-98 (2002).
20. 525 U.S. 70, 80-81 (1998).
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established union duty of fair representation. Significantly, the
Supreme Court in Wright recognized, but did not resolve, the ques-
tion of whether "Gardner-Denver's seemingly absolute prohibition of
union waiver of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer."2
For the lower courts since Gilmer, the major question in assessing
mandatory arbitration is whether the agreement imposed by the
employer is so one-sided and unfair as to be "unconscionable" and
thus unenforceable. Part IV, infra, will deal with this issue.
II. THE DEBATABLE NATURE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Arguments against mandatory arbitration are easy to make, and
they are conceptually powerful. That is especially true when sensi-
tive statutory rights are at stake. Congress, or some other legislative
body, has prohibited various types of employment discrimination
and has prescribed certain procedures for the enforcement of
those rights. In a given case the specified procedures, sometimes
including the right to a jury trial, may be almost as important as
the substantive rights themselves. No employer, acting alone or in
conjunction with a union, should be able to force an employee to
waive the statutorily provided forum, procedures, and remedies as
the price of getting or keeping ajob. Conditioning employment on
the surrender of statutory entitlements would seem a blatant af-
front to public policy.
Opponents contend that an employer dealing with an individual
employee is the "repeat player" against the one-timer, and invariably
more knowledgeable about arbitral procedures and the arbitrators
21. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944) (holding that
Railway Labor Act's grant of exclusive bargaining authority to railroad union included im-
position of a duty to represent fairly all employees in craft or class without discrimination
because of race); Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1969)
(holding that employees could sue union and employer for unfair representation under
Railway Labor Act without full exhaustion of internal remedies because latter effort would
be futile); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am. Local 12 v. NLRB, 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). Applying modern "public choice" theory concerning the political
power of cohesive minority groups within any organization, one scholar has predicted that
unions would not agree to arbitrate statutory claims if such groups believed arbitration was
not in their best interest. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
(Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake ofGilner v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REv. 591,605.
22. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80. Whether a union's clear and unmistakable waiver of em-
ployees' right to ajudicial forum for statutory discrimination claims is enforceable as part of
an arbitration agreement may be decided by the Supreme Court in Pyett v. Pennsylvania
Building Co., 498 F3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 128
S. Ct. 1223 (Feb. 19, 2008).
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themselves. 3 It has also been asserted that some sizable, well-
publicized jury verdicts could do much more to deter workplace
discrimination than any number of smaller, confidential arbitra-
tion awards. 4 A distinguished federal judge has further observed
that the diversion of a large amount of civil rights litigation from
the courts to arbitration, with the resulting decrease in the number
of published judicial opinions, could have an enervating effect on
the development of legal doctrine in this area. For some persons,
an employer's provision for arbitration is also a not-so-subtle anti-
union device, since securing a grievance and arbitration system is
regarded as one of the principal benefits of unionization and col-
lective bargaining. For these and other reasons, numerous
scholars, two federal agencies, and two prestigious private bodies
have gone on record as opposed to mandatory arbitration of statu-
tory employment claims. 6
Against that position, a rugged individualist or legal formalist
might contend that "freedom of contract" supports the legitimacy
of so-called mandatory arbitration. After all, no one is forcing an
employee to take or keep any particular job. But Twentieth Cen-
23. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'YJ. 189 (1997).
24. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in
the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 429-31 (1996). Arbitral awards are tradi-
tionally not published unless all parties consent. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 571-72 (Alan Miles Ruben Ed., 6th ed. 2003).
25. Harry T Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims
in Employment?16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 293, 297 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENVER U. L. REv. 1017 (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33;
EEOC, Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) FEP 405:7301-7302
(1997). In July 1997, the EEOC issued a longer and even stronger condemnation of compul-
sory arbitration or pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, declaring that "even the best arbitral
systems do not afford the benefits of the judicial system." EEOC, Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, 8 LAB. REL. REp. (BNA) FEP
405:7511, 405:7520 (1997). According to the court in Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d
1465, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the NLRB General Counsel was apparently prepared at one
point to issue unfair labor practice complaints on the issue. See also THE DUNLOP COMMIS-
SION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF COMMERCE AND
LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMIS-
SION]; National Academy of Arbitrators, Statement on Condition of Employment Agreements, in
ARBITRATION 1997: THE NEXT FIFry YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 50TH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 312 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1998). The NAA softened its
opposition somewhat on May 27, 2007, stating that "voluntary arbitration is always prefer-
able," and "employees should be allowed to opt freely, post-dispute, for either the courts and
administrative tribunals or arbitration." See National Academy of Arbitrators, Policy State-
ment on Employment Arbitration (May 27, 2007), available at http://www.naarb.org/due_
process/due-process.html (last visited April 2, 2008).
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tury law recognized the value of competing public policies, espe-
cially in regulating a field like employment with its customarily
unequal participants, and freedom of contract in such a context
will no longer carry the day. 7 Still, for all the plausible arguments
against mandatory arbitration that have been presented, they are
plainly not conclusive. Thus, for example, one study indicates the
greater success of the repeat player is simply the result of employer
experience, not arbitrator bias.28 In any event the repeat-player ef-
fect will diminish with the increasing growth of a plaintiffs-
claimants bar. The deterrent value of a few large jury verdicts
would seem evident, and yet it is widely thought that the certainty
of sanctions is more of a deterrent than their severity.29 The notion
that the use of arbitration will inhibit the development of a body of
judicial doctrine on workplace discrimination seems highly suspect
in light of the very large caseload of the federal courts in this
area.30 The history recounted above indicates that employers' re-
sort to mandatory arbitration in the 1980s was triggered far more
by the size of jury verdicts and the cost of litigation than by efforts
to stymie union organization.3
There is no doubt that post-dispute arbitration agreements are
inherently fairer to workers than mandatory, pre-dispute agree-
ments. The latter are usually executed by employees at the time
of hiring, when they are prone to sign any document placed be-
fore them. The post-dispute agreement is more likely to be truly
voluntary, since it is entered into after a particular issue has arisen,
27. See, e.g., 15 GRACE McLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CON-
TRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY § 79.4, at 22 (Jospeh M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003). See LLOYD G.
REYNOLDS, STANLEY H. MASTERS & COLLETFA H. MOSER, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR
RELATIONS 7-8 (9th ed. 1986), for a discussion of the disparity in employer and employee
bargaining power.
28. David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employ-
ment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1571 (2005).
29. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv.
349, 380 (1997); Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 721, 731 (2005). Cf infra Part Il-A.
30. During the current decade, filings of civil rights employment claims in federal
court have averaged about 18,500 cases a year. That is more than the average total of cases
under all labor laws combined. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table C-2A, at 165-67.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. Except for a short-lived spurt during the
Korean War, union density had been in steady decline since 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act
was passed. That year unionized employees constituted 33.7% of nonagricultural employ-
ment. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 507 (1978). By 2007 union
density had fallen to 12.1% overall and to 7.5% in the private sector. Union Members in 2007,
NEWS RELEASE USDL 08-0092 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, D.C.), Jan. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
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the relevant facts are mostly known, and the employee can make
an informed decision about whether to arbitrate or go to court. If
an employee has been discharged, he or she has little or nothing to
lose by rejecting an employer's offer of arbitration.
Yet this may be another instance where the best is the enemy of
the good. Management representatives testified before the Dunlop
Commission that employers would generally not be willing to enter
into post-dispute agreements to arbitrate.32 Employers will wait out
most smaller claims, assuming employees will not be able to pursue
them in court. Conversely, employees and their lawyers are unlikely
to agree to arbitrate a big case at the expense of forgoing a judge
and jury. Pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, when neither party
knows what may occur later, might be the most sensible arrange-
33
ment for both sides as a practical matter. In my mind, this gets to
the heart of this long-running debate. Employers generally believe
they are better off with arbitration than with costly court suits be-
fore emotionally aroused juries. What about an ordinary rank-and-
file worker with a relatively small monetary claim but with a job
and its related benefits at stake? What better serves him in actual
operation: a mandatory arbitration system, defects and all, or the
statutorily provided access to federal or state court? That is the
critical inquiry, and here facts count more than abstract theories.
To that we now turn.
III. A COMPARISON OF COURT SUITS AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION
A. Access toJudicial and Arbitral Processes
The first and utterly indispensable requirement for an embat-
tled claimant is an accessible forum. Unless one can secure that,
the theoretically superior qualities of a particular tribunal amount
to nothing but a beguiling mirage. Experienced plaintiffs' attor-
neys have estimated that only about 5% of the individuals with an
employment claim who seek help from the private bar are able to
obtain counsel.34 One of the Detroit area's top employment special-
32. See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
DEP'TS OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, FACT FINDING REPORT 118 (May 1994).
33. For an elaboration of this position, see Samuel Estreicher, Saturnsfor Rickshaws: The
Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 559, 563-64 (2001).
34. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM.
Hum. RTS. L. REv. 29, 58 (1998); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Dis-
crimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen? 50 DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-
Dec. 1995, at 40, 45.
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ists was more precise in a conversation with me. His secretary kept
an actual count; he took on one out of eighty-seven persons who
contacted him for possible representation. In the recent and per-
haps most comprehensive survey of empirical studies of
employment arbitration, Professor Alexander Colvin of Pennsyl-
vania State University has indicated that "one of the key potential
advantages of employment arbitration over litigation is that the
relatively high costs of litigation inhibit access to the courts by
lower to mid-income ranges [sic] employees."35 One study con-
cluded that litigation is not a plausible option for employees below
around the $60,000 income level, but arbitration is a realistic al-
ternative. 3 In 2005 the median income of full-time, year-round
workers aged 25-64 was $39,509. 7 Such persons will seldom be
able to get to court to contest a discharge.
Professor Peter Feuille of the University of Illinois, in his com-
ment on Professor Colvin's paper as presented at a conference
sponsored by the National Academy of Arbitrators in early 2007 in
Chicago, said his own conclusion was that the ordinary employee's
alternative to arbitration for pursuit of his or her claims was, for all
practical purposes, "Nothing. 38 Lewis Maltby, President of the Na-
tional Workrights Institute, is an opponent of mandatory
arbitration. Yet at this same conference he recounted the troubling
experience he had while serving as director of the ACLU's Task
Force on Civil Liberties in the Workplace. Many persons ap-
proached him with reports of wrongful treatment in their jobs.
Although he concluded that most of the claims were unsustainable,
he believed a couple dozen or so were legitimate and should be
taken to court. He placed many calls asking lawyers for assistance.
Even with Maltby's prescreening of the cases, he was able to find
representation for only one employee.
Of course, a substantial number of those who cannot obtain le-
gal representation do not have meritorious claims. But others are
workers whose potential dollar recovery will simply not justify the
35. Alexanderj.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the
Sound and Fury?, 11 EMp. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 405, 419 (2007), citing Estreicher, supra note
33; Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An
Empirical Comparison, 58 Disp. RESOL.J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44.
36. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, 58 Disp. RESOL.
J., May-Jul. 2003, at 8, 10-11.
37. U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Demographic Survey, March Supplement, available at
http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032006/perinc/newO3_O28.hun. (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
38. National Academy of Arbitrators, 2007 Spring Educational Conference, Beyond
the Due Process Protocol: The Future of Due Process in Workplace Dispute Resolution,
April 13-14, 2007. The author attended this conference.
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investment of the time and money of a first-rate lawyer in prepar-
ing a court action. For those individuals, the cheaper, simpler
process of arbitration is the most feasible recourse. It will cost a
lawyer far less time and effort to take a case to arbitration; at worst,
claimants can represent themselves or be represented by layper-
sons in this much less formal and intimidating forum.
Individual employees with discrimination claims may find little
relief from the EEOC. Before a severely overburdened and under-
funded Commission resorted to its "triage" procedure in the mid-
1990s, classifying cases as "A," "B," or "C" priorities depending on
merit and importance, and tossing out many charges after the
briefest of investigations, its backlog had soared past 100,000 and it
was receiving almost 100,000 new charges a year.3 9 The situation
was so bleak that one knowledgeable scholar recommended, quite
understandably, that the EEOC get out of the business of handling
individual charges and husband its limited resources for routing
out systemic unlawful practices.4 At best, the Commission tends to
concentrate on the big case or the test case. Again, for many indi-
vidual discriminatees, it looks like arbitration--or nothing.
B. Results in Arbitration and in Court
Early reports on the relative success rates of claimants in em-
ployment arbitration and in court were quite startling, suggesting
that employees did far better in arbitration. The American Arbitra-
tion Association in one study found a winning rate of 63% for
arbitral claimants. 41 In a much-criticized system operated by the
securities industry, employees still prevailed 55% of the time, ac-
cording to the U.S. General Accounting Office." By contrast,
plaintiffs' success rates in separate surveys of federal court and
EEOC trials were only 14.9% and 16.8%, respectively. 3 As might be
expected, successful plaintiffs obtained larger awards from judges or
juries, but claimants as a group recovered more in arbitration.4
39. EEOC Adopts Change-Priority System, 149 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), May 1, 1995, at 13,
14; National Enforcement Plan Tops EEOC Agenda, 151 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), Feb. 5, 1996, at
143, 156.
40. Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 219, 278-79 (1995).
41. Maltby, supra note 34, at 46.
42. Id. at 50. See also HoYT N. WHEELER, BRIAN S. KLASS & DOUGLAS M. MAHONY,
WORKPLACEJUSTICE WITHOUT UNIONS 48 (2004).
43. Maltby, supra note 34, at 46, 49. In their own research into cases decided mostly in
the late 1990s, Professor Wheeler and his colleagues found a 12% employee win rate in federal
district court as contrasted with 33% in arbitration. WHEELER ET AL., supra note 42, at 54.
44. Maltby, supra note 34, at 54.
[VOL. 41:4
HeinOnline  -- 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 792 2007-2008
Mandatory Arbitration
Some of these early reports may have been comparing apples
and oranges. Professor Colvin, in his more recent study, points out
that "a majority of these awards appear to have involved claims by
employees, typically managers and executives, under individually
negotiated contracts, rather than claims brought under arbitration
provisions from employment manuals or handbooks."4 5 When
more refined analyses took account of these differences, the suc-
cess rates varied significantly. Professor Lisa Bingham of Indiana
University found in two separate studies that employees won 68.8
and 61.3% of the claims based on individual contracts but only
21.3 and 27.6% of the claims based on personnel manuals.46 A later
report on 200 American Arbitration Association awards from 1999
and 2000 showed an employee win rate of 34% in cases based on
employer-mandated plans as against an overall win rate of 43% for
all claims. 7
Professor Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell University and Eliza-
beth Hill introduced several helpful distinctions in analyzing the
outcomes of 215 American Arbitration Association cases resolved
in the 1999-2000 period and the results of 1430 federal court em-
ployment discrimination trials of that period and 305 state court
trials in 1996.48 In non-civil rights employment disputes, higher-
paid employees (more likely operating under individual contracts)
won 64.9% of the arbitrations and lower-paid employees (more
likely operating under employer-promulgated plans) won 39.6%,
while state court trials resulted in a 56.6 winning percentage for
plaintiffs, who were probably mostly higher-paid employees.49 In
civil-rights employment cases, the winning percentages in arbitra-
tions were 40.0 for higher-paid employees and 24.3 for lower-paid
employees, 43.8 for plaintiffs in state court trials, and 36.4 in fed-
eral court trials. Especially if one assumes that most plaintiffs in
court actions were higher-paid employees, the differences in result
were negligible. Also significant, of the 215 arbitral resolutions,
45. Colvin, supra note 35, at 413.
46. Lisa B. Bingham, An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United States: Law, Pub-
lic Policy and Data, 23 NEW ZEALAND J. INDUS. REL., June 1998, at 5, 16; Lisa B. Bingham &
Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-
Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT
ARENA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR
303, 323, tbl.2 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004).
47. Hill, supra note 36, at 11, 13.
48. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 35, at 48-49, tbl.1. Employees earning less than
$60,000 a year were classified as "lower-pay." Id. at 46.
49. Id.
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only 42, or 19.5%, dealt with employment discrimination claims."
The great majority dealt with claims based on individual contracts,
personnel manuals, and the like. This sharply reduces the argu-
ment that arbitration, mandatory or otherwise, is having a
deleterious effect on the enforcement of civil rights legislation. Fi-
nally, pre-trial settlements may .skew the comparative figures
between court judgments and arbitration awards. Since employers
win the vast majority of summary judgments in federal court em-
ployment cases, and since employers naturally try to buy out the
stronger employee cases during preliminary proceedings in litiga-
tion, decent arguments can be made either way about whether trial
results exaggerate or depress employee win rates, at least in federal
court.
5
'
Professors David Sherwyn and Michael Heise of Cornell Univer-
sity and Samuel Estreicher of New York University, after concluding
from various empirical studies that "there is no evidence that plain-
tiffs fare significantly better in litigation [than in arbitration],"
would take an entirely different approach in assessing the respec-
tive merits of dispute resolution systems.2 As they put it: "A more
useful barometer would focus on the resolutions of discrimination
cases that take place during conciliation, mediation, and settle-
ment negotiations. '' 53 On the basis of highly preliminary
comparisons between EEOC data and the experience of one major
company, the authors observe that disputes were resolved more
often by the employer than by EEOC, without resort to "external
resources" such as courts or arbitration, and they were resolved
much more quickly by the employer's internal processes (81% of
the claims in less than a week).54 Also, the damages awarded by the
employer averaged less than one-third of the EEOC's, in major
part because of the swiftness of the employer's settlements but also
because the EEOC considers only legally cognizable claims.55 Inso-
far as this study focused on data involving the EEOC and
employment discrimination claims, however, it does not cover the
most common grist for arbitration's mill, which consists of claims
based on contracts or personnel manuals.56
Curiously, there have been few recent comparisons of employee
win rates in employment arbitration (generally nonunion) and in
50. Id.
51. See Colvin, supra note 35, at 416-18.
52. Sherwyn et al., supra note 28, at 1578.
53. Id. at 1582. See also Colvin, supra note 35, at 438-42.
54. Sherwyn et al., supra note 28, at 1588-89.
55. Id. at 1589.
56. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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traditional labor arbitration (between unions and employers).5' The
members of the National Academy of Arbitrators, who adopted a
policy statement opposing mandatory employment arbitration but
whose principal occupation is labor arbitration, would undoubt-
edly regard the latter as the gold standard of arbitration. The same
view is probably held by many if not most of the academic oppo-
nents of mandatory employment arbitration. Yet many persons
(including me) would be surprised by the results of an examina-
tion I made of the outcomes of the 200 latest discharge arbitrations
filed from 1999 to 2007 in one of the country's oldest and most
respected union-management arbitration systems. The issue was
whether there was 'Just cause" or "proper cause" for the discharges
under the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Employees
were reinstated or received other substantial relief in only 46 in-
stances, or 23% of the 200 arbitrations.5 That is a lower winning
percentage than in all but one of the employment arbitration stud-
ies previously discussed.
C. Conclusions
Winning percentages for one selected group of participants are
hardly the best gauge of the fairness of any dispute resolution sys-
tem. A whole host of factors, alone or in combination, including a
party's financial resources and representation, the specified steps
of the process, the competence of the decision-maker, and indeed
one hopes the facts in evidence, may have a crucial bearing on the
outcome. But insofar as a comparison between employee win rates
in employment arbitration and those in either court litigation or in
traditional labor arbitration is any guide, it cannot be said that
57. Comparisons of the way employment arbitrators and labor arbitrators treat hypo-
thetical scenarios have been conducted by Lisa B. Bingham & Deborah J. Mesch, Decision
Making in Employment and Labor Arbitration, 39 INDUS. REL. 671 (2000); Brian S. Klaas, Doug-
las Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Decision-Making about Workplace Disputes: A Policy-Capturing
Study of Employment Arbitrators, Labor Arbitrators, and Jurors, 45 INDus. REL. 68 (2006). Both
studies found employment arbitrators significantly less likely to rule for employees than
labor arbitrators. But Binghan and Mesch found that the employment-labor distinction was
not statistically significant if the occupation and other characteristics of the arbitrator were
taken into account. 39 INDUS. REL. at 688. Attorneys who arbitrate were less favorable toward
employees than full-time arbitrators or part-time arbitrators from academia.
58. The relatively low employee/union success rate is probably attributable to the
company's extensive experience with the type of discharges that will be upheld and the
union's willingness to let grievants have their "day in court." Earlier studies indicated that
union grievants generally won in whole or in part at least half the time in labor arbitrations.
Bingham, supra note 46, at 10-11.
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mandatory arbitration in actual practice is detrimental to the indi-
vidual employee. For most lower-paid workers, it may in fact be
their only feasible option. Most important, then, is the accessibility
to a forum that any kind of arbitration, including mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration, offers such employees. After the initial contrary
outcry from scholarly critics, an increasing number of them now
seem more favorably disposed.59 Ironically, however, the former em-
ployer enthusiasm for mandatory arbitration may be waning, as
management recognizes the success employees have had under this
regime.60 I would like to think that it will turn out to be a win-win
situation. Employees, particularly those at the lower end of the pay
scale, will find readier access to effective relief in arbitration, and
employers will find fewer devastating jury verdicts and lower litiga-
tion costs in general. The remaining inquiry goes to what is
necessary to ensure that mandatory arbitration will meet appropri-
ate due process standards.
V. ENSURING FAIRNESS IN ARBITRATION PROCEDURES
All disinterested scholars and reputable groups that have con-
sidered mandatory arbitration agree it is vital that employees be
accorded due process. A reasonable consensus has developed
about certain procedural requirements for a fair individual arbitra-
tion, mandatory or otherwise. About other proposed requirements
there is still considerable debate. These questions will be discussed
next.
A. Generally Accepted Standards of Due Process
In the mid-1990s both the Dunlop Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations and a broadly sponsored Task
Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, which
drafted a Due Process Protocol, produced very similar lists of
59. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Creating and Challenging Compulsory Arbitration Agreements,
13 LAB. LAW. 511 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Pre-dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Em-
ployment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182 (1997); Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and
Cole, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 221 (1997).
60. Cf Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth ofEmployer Advantagefrom Using Mandatory
Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 418-64 (2000); Daniel B. Tukel, To
Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate Discrimination Claims: That Is Now the Question for Michigan Employers,
79 MICH. B.J. 1206, 1207-08 (2000).
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necessary procedural guarantees in employment arbitration.61
These included:
1. A jointly selected neutral arbitrator who knows the
law.
2. Simple, adequate discovery.
3. Cost-sharing to ensure arbitrator neutrality.6
2
4. Right to representation by a person of the em-
ployee's choice.
5. Remedies equal to those provided by the law.
6. A written opinion and award, with reasons.
7. Limited judicial review, concentrating on the law.
The variegated membership of the Task Force that produced the
Due Process Protocol was not able to take a position on the accept-
ability of pre-dispute as distinguished from post-dispute agreements
to arbitrate-and thus effectively on their "voluntariness"6-- but it
did agree they should be "knowingly made."64 In contrast, the more
homogeneous membership of the Dunlop Commission (mostly
academics and neutral persons) could declare: "[A]ny choice be-
tween available methods for enforcing statutory employment rights
should be left to the individual who feels wronged rather than dic-
tated by his or her employment contract."65 Significantly, however,
Professor Paul Weiler of Harvard, who served as counsel to the
61. See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 118-19; TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
(1995), reprinted in 9A LAB. REL. REp. (BNA) IERM 534:401 (1996) [hereinafter DUE PROC-
ESS PROTOCOL]. The Task Force consisted of management, union, and plaintiffs' attorneys
from the American Bar Association and the National Employment Lawyers Association, and
representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the American Civil Liberties Union,
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Academy of Arbitrators, and
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. Id. at 534:404.
62. In Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 E3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the court re-
quired (2-1) the employer to pay all the arbitrator's fees as a condition for enforcing an
individual employee's waiver of a judicial forum. Judge Harry Edwards, who spoke for the
majority, was surely correct that the source of payment is not the key to arbitrator neutrality.
Id. at 1485. Arbitrators are naturally concerned about getting their fee but ordinarily not
about where it comes from. Id. Individual employees, of course, may feel more comfortable
paying part of the arbitrator's fees, fearing that whoever pays the piper may also call the
tune. Cole may have gone too far, moreover, in insisting that the employer pay all of the arbi-
trator's fee. Access to a court, at least initially, would normally not be cost-free. Id. at 1484.
See infra text accompanying note 121 (consideration of the issue of costs).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32 (distinguishing pre-dispute and post-
dispute arbitration agreements).
64. DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 61, at 38.
65. DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 33.
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Commission, told me he had reservations about this position on
the grounds that even mandatory arbitration provided employees
with an access they might not otherwise have to relief for employ-
ment wrongdoing. The Commission itself hinted at the possibility
of more flexibility in the future, by suggesting that the issue be re-
visited after there was more experience with the arbitration of
employment claims.66
The influence of the Employment Protocol in particular has
been substantial. Thus, such major providers of arbitral services as
the American Arbitration Association and JAMS (originally the Ju-
dicial Arbitration and Mediation Services) endorsed the Protocol
and decreed they would not administer arbitrations that did not
comply with the Protocol's principles. 6Y The Employment Protocol
also served as the model for two additional Protocols, the Due
Process Protocol for Consumer Disputes and the Health Care Due
Process Protocol.68 Finally, courts and legislative bodies have taken
the Employment Protocol into account in their decisions and de-
liberations. 9 Yet since the Employment Protocol was written, the
courts have had to confront a whole host of new issues not antici-
pated at the time. These will be the subject of the last part of this
Article .70
B. Major Due Process Issues in Employment Arbitration
At the 2007 conference sponsored by the National Academy of
Arbitrators on "Beyond the Due Process Protocol," Professors
Richard Bales of Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Ken-
tucky University, and Martin H. Malin of the Chicago-Kent College
of Law discussed extensively a number of the major issues of due
process in employment arbitration which have emerged in recent
years, and which remain largely unresolved.7' I shall focus on sev-
eral that I regard as especially important and especially difficult.
66. Id.
67. Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp.
RESOL. 369, 403-04 (2004).
68. Id. at 405.
69. Id. at 409-12.
70. See generally Harding, supra note 67; Richard A. Bales, Beyond the Protocol: Recent
Trends in Employment Arbitration, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 301 (2007).
71. See generally Bales, supra note 70; Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration:
The State of the Law and the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EmP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 363 (2007).
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1. General Principles
In Cole v. Burns International Security Services,72 the D.C. Circuit
held that a court could enforce an employment arbitration ar-
rangement as long as it:
1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than
minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides
for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available
in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either
unreasonable costs or any arbitrators'.fees or expenses as a condi-
tion of access to the arbitration forum. 3
As can be seen, these conditions parallel the requirements of the
Due Process Protocol, except for the provision against the em-
ployee's payment of "any" arbitrators' fees.4 In Professor Malin's
view, Cole portended a regime of "strict judicial policing," in which
the courts would rely on the policies of any statutes involved and
the common-law concept of unconscionability to safeguard em-
ployees' rights under employer-promulgated arbitration systems.5
Cole's use of five specified conditions for a valid arbitration agree-
ment indeed suggests that the courts should apply "bright-line"
rules. That would be in keeping, Malin feels, with Gilmer's notion
that mandatory arbitration only changes the forum, not any sub-
stantive rights, and must be structured so as not to imperil the
vindication of statutory rights.
76
The Supreme Court charted a quite different course in Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph77 and a subsequent series of deci-
sions under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) .78 Although these
cases did not involve employment arbitration, their reasoning
seems clearly applicable. The cumulative import is that the ques-
tion whether arbitral procedures impair the effective vindication of
employees' federal statutory rights must be resolved on a case-by-
case analysis of the particular facts, and is generally an issue for the
72. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
73. Id. at 1482 (emphasis added regarding arbitrator's fees and expenses).
74. See DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 61, at IERM 534:404.
75. See Malin, supra note 71, at 366-67.
76. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
77. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
78. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). The FAA applies to employment arbitration agreements
except those in the transportation industry. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001).
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arbitrator to decide, not the court.79 In Randolph the plaintiff had
financed the purchase of a mobile home through an agreement
that required the arbitration of all disputes arising under the
agreement. Plaintiff Randolph sued lender Green Tree, alleging
violations of federal statutes on truth in lending and equal credit
opportunity. The arbitration agreement did not specify which party
would be responsible for the arbitrator's fees and related costs. In a
five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held the agreement to
arbitrate was enforceable, stating that "where, as here, a party seeks
to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitra-
tion would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden
of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs. Randolph did
not meet that burden." °
Professor Malin argues strongly that the Supreme Court took a
wrong turn in Green Tree v. Randolph and its progeny, placing too
heavy and ill-defined a burden on employees and other plaintiffs,
and that questions of arbitral adequacy should be resolved by the
courts, not by arbitrators, especially when statutory rights are at
stake."' Malin makes some excellent points but they must be placed
in perspective. The substantial majority of arbitration cases do not
involve statutory claims; they are contractual claims of one type or
another."' The latter come without any specific legislative policies
to serve as guidelines in developing appropriate due process stan-
dards. In any event, we do not know that arbitrators will be any less
generous to employees than would be the judiciary, particularly
today's relatively conservative federal judiciary, in resolving the
various procedural and remedial questions that have emerged in
employment arbitration in recent years. I also do not think we can
yet be sure whether fact-specific case-by-case determinations or the
kind of bright-line rules enunciated by Cole will be fairer for both
employers and employees. What we can be sure about is that the
answers in most cases will come faster, cheaper, and more easily in
arbitration than in court.
79. See, e.g., PacificCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2001) (arbitration enforce-
able even though agreement precluded "punitive" damages and claim was under federal
statute authorizing treble damages; arbitrator must resolve "ambiguity"); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (silence of arbitration agreement on permissibility of
class actions left the question for arbitrator rather than court); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (validity under state law of contract containing arbitration
clause was issue for arbitrator).
80. 531 U.S. at 91-92. Randolph would seem to have assumed that the courts would de-
termine whether the arbitral arrangements impaired a plaintiff's capacity to vindicate
statutory rights. Later decisions definitely appear to make the question one for the arbitra-
tor in the usual case. See cases cited supra note 79.
81. Malin, supra note 71, at 367-78.
82. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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In addition to testing arbitral procedures against statutory poli-
cies in those cases where a statutory claim exists, decision-makers
have available a more expansive and generally applicable standard
in the common-law doctrine of unconscionability. While the term
has no generally accepted definition, Professor Corbin's classic
treatise on contract law underscores the influence of the Uniform
Commercial Code in establishing the purpose of the doctrine as
the prevention of two evils, oppression and unfair surprise. Corbin
continues:
Although this twofold purpose has led to a distinction be-
tween "substantive" (oppression) and "procedural" (unfair
surprise) unconscionability, most cases do not neatly fall into
one of these two categories. More frequently, elements of
both are present. Indeed, some courts have said that both
elements must ordinarily be present before a finding of un-
conscionability can be made.83
Courts have been willing to deal directly with unconscionability
challenges to employment arbitration arrangements, rather than
referring them to arbitrators, but the results are often widely di-
verse.8 4 The following are some examples of important due process
issues in employment arbitration, as handled by both courts and
arbitrators.
2. Arbitrator Selection
The Employment Due Process Protocol contemplates as a stan-
dard procedure that the parties will select an arbitrator from a panel
list supplied by a neutral designating agency such as the American
Arbitration Association.8 5 One of the most pro-arbitration federal
courts, the Fourth Circuit, invalidated an employer's unilaterally es-
tablished arbitral rules as "so one-sided that their only possible
purpose is to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding," in part
because the employer was given unlimited control over the composi-
tion of the arbitration panel.S6 Nonetheless, suppose an employer, in
83. 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: AVOIDANCE AND REFORMATION
§ 29.4, at 388 (rev. ed. 2002).
84. See Malin, supra note 71, at 380-83; See generally Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
85. DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 61, at 38-39.
86. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999).
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order to save time and designating agency costs, creates its own
panel, consisting of seven of the area's most respected arbitrators,
five of whom are members of the National Academy of Arbitrators.
An employee is then offered the choice of any of the seven, with
the right to propose still another arbitrator if the employee could
show reasonable grounds for rejecting all seven persons on the
employer's panel.
The Sixth Circuit invalidated an arbitration selection procedure
much like the one I have just described on the grounds that the
employer still had "exclusive control over the pool of potential ar-
bitrators,"8 7 even though the arbitrators on the panel had to meet
certain specified qualifications to ensure neutrality. But signifi-
cantly my hypothetical arrangement contained a possible escape
clause for employees with reasonable objections to the whole of
the employer's pool, and that might have made a difference with
the Sixth Circuit. s8 Moreover, the plaintiff in the actual case was
claiming Title VII violations and thus the Gilmer standard applied
that the arbitral procedures must not impair a plaintiff's capacity to
vindicate statutory rights.8 9
In appraising the fairness of arbitrator-selection procedures,
whether or not statutory rights are implicated, would a bright-line
rule or a case-by-case analysis of the parties' contractual arrange-
ment and their relationship seem more appropriate? I would
applaud a designating agency or an employer that, as a matter of
self-regulation, adopted rather stringent and hard-and-fast rules to
enable the fullest practicable participation by employees in the se-
lection process. But if a particular employer, especially one
creating "good cause" contractual standards for employee discipline
or discharge, prescribed an appointment procedure like the one in
my above hypothetical (an employer-chosen panel with an em-
ployee "veto" for cause), I believe a court could properly take
account of all the facts in assessing its validity. Against the back-
87. McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2004). Although the court
struck down the offending portion of the arbitration provision, it upheld the trial court's
severance of the clause and its order to arbitrate, with the substitution of the American Arbi-
tration Association's arbitrator selection procedures. McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 166 Fed.
Appx. 164 (6th Cir. 2006). This approach, severing the invalid provision but enforcing arbi-
tration, might appear a reasonable compromise. But it leaves the old problem that
employers will have less incentive to clean up their contracts. Most employees will simply go
along with the arbitration arrangement as written.
88. Cf Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898, 904 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding agreement not unconscionable where employee had power to "veto" employer's
selection, which would result in court appointment of arbitrator under FAA), affd after re-
mand on other grounds sub noma., Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002),
vacated and remanded, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
89. McMullen. 355 F.3d at 491 n.5.
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drop of American at-will employment, perhaps a self-imposed limit
on the right to fire workers arbitrarily would justify allowing an
employer some latitude in the arbitrator-selection process.
3. Shortening Limitations Periods
Collective bargaining agreements in unionized enterprises
commonly require grievances to be filed within thirty days or so of
the occurrence giving rise to the claim. 90 These short periods are
explained by the desire to avoid a "festering" of complaints in the
workplace and to obtain a clear picture of the facts while memories
and other evidence are still fresh. The presence of a union and a
well-established and well-publicized grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure greatly reduces the likelihood that a union employee will
fail to file a timely grievance. The situation is much different in a
nonunion firm. Employees may be unaware even of the fairly gen-
erous 180-day or one-year time limits in many employer-
promulgated arbitration systems. Statutes, of course, often provide
for longer limitations periods for legal claims. What happens when
an employee files a claim with the employer within the statutory
period but beyond the internal plan's deadline? The Due Process
Protocol does not deal with this question expressly and the courts
have responded dissimilarly.
In a sexual harassment case, the Ninth Circuit held substantively
unconscionable an employer's one-year statute of limitations be-
cause it would conflict with the continuing violation doctrine
under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act.9' For that
and other reasons the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. A
federal district court in Michigan ruled unconscionable and unen-
forceable an arbitration agreement with a six-month limitations
period as applied to a claim under the federal Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), while the FMLA's limitations are three years for
willful violations and two years for others.92 In so doing the court
boldly distinguished a decision from its own court of appeals,93 with
the comment that the latter's permission for waivers only applied
90. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 24, at 217-27. Some labor contracts have no
specified time limit, or only a "reasonable" one, on the filing of grievances. Id. at 218.
91. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003).
92. Conway v. Stryker Med. Div., No. 4:05-CV-40, 2006 WL 1008670 at *2 (W.D. Mich.
2006).
93. Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d 352, 357-59 (6th Cir. 2004) (uphold-
ing a six-month arbitral filing period without saying the scope of the ruling was limited on
the reasonableness of waiving longer statutory periods).
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to state law and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, not to claims under
the FMLA.
94
Other courts have been more accommodating for employers.
The Sixth Circuit held that a one-year limitation period imposed
by an arbitration agreement would not "unduly burden" an em-
ployee's vindication of rights under federal civil rights legislation. 9
Indeed, there is substantial federal case authority declaring that
regardless of the existence of an arbitration clause, an employee's
agreement for a "reasonable" shortening of the limitations periods
in federal statutes will be upheld. A one-year limitations period
would not affect the 180-day and 300-day initial filing periods of
such commonly used federal antidiscrimination legislation as Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,97 the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act,98 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.99 A court
might well feel differently about a 30-day or 60-day limitations pe-
riod in the contract of an individual employee, even though those
are standard filing requirements in the collective agreements of
unionized employees.
A third approach is for the court to refer the matter to the arbi-
trator. A federal district court in Tennessee thus held that the
question of timeliness was a "gateway" procedural issue and not a
defense against arbitration on which the court should rule.'0° The
court added "Although the court cannot conclude, as a matter of
federal arbitration law, that the ninety (90) day time limit is per se
unenforceable, there are a number of legal and equitable reasons
why an arbitrator might decide not to enforce the limit on the facts
of this case."'0 ' The Third Circuit has similarly taken the position
that the validity of an arbitration agreement's provision for a limi-
tations period shorter than that contained in the relevant statute is
a question for the arbitrator. °2 The same court added that the arbi-
trator should also handle the application of the American
Arbitration Association's rule, which was incorporated in the arbi-
tration agreement, that in disputes involving statutory rights, the
94. Conway, 2006 WL 1008670 at *2.
95. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 673 n.16 (6th Cir. 2003).
96. See, e.g., Northlake Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Waffle House Sys. Employee Benefit Plan, 160
F. 3d 1301, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 1998) (ERISA); Taylor v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188,
1203-06 (7th Cir. 1992) (§ 1981).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) & (2) (2000).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 7 (a) (2000).
100. Hardin v. Morningside ofJackson, L.L.C., 425 F. Supp. 2d 898, 911-12 (W.D. Tenn.
2006). See generally Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-86 (2002).
101. Hardin, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
102. See Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1997) (one-
year limitations period in agreement).
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relevant statute's limitations period should govern the time for fil-
ing for arbitration.'O° I have not yet seen reports on how arbitrators
are deciding these abbreviated limitations and other due process
issues.
4. Class Action Waivers
Parties in a superior bargaining position, such as employers and
business firms, frequently impose prohibitions on class actions in
their arbitration agreements with employees and customers. The
primary purpose is to discourage the pursuit of small monetary
claims, where the individual may have so little at stake that it is not
worth the costs even to seek arbitration. Only a class or collective
action is a realistic option. Not surprisingly, most challenges to
waivers of the right to bring a class action in arbitration have dealt
with consumer claims rather than employee claims.10 4 Employees
typically have a dispute over ajob and often thousands of dollars in
lost pay. That is generally worth pursuing even on an individual
basis.
The most notable recent decision on the validity of class action
waivers in an employee's arbitration agreement is Gentry v. Superior
Court.1 05 Gentry sued Circuit City on behalf of himself and other
salaried customer service managers, alleging they had been mis-
classified as exempt employees not entitled to overtime pay under
California's wage and hour laws.' 0 Circuit City moved to compel
arbitration.' 7 Gentry's agreement contained a class action waiver as
well as a provision allowing the employee 30 days to opt out of the
103. Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 611 (3d Cir. 2003) (arbitration agree-
ment contained a shorter one-year limitations period). The court also cited approvingly a
prior decision in which the court itself addressed the merits of a public policy claim against
an arbitral provision. Id. at 611.
104. Court reactions have varied. Compare Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d
250, 267-68, 274-75 (Ill. 2006) (finding class action waiver in arbitration agreement of cel-
lular phone provider was unconscionable), and Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 59-
61 (1st Cir. 2006) (invalidating waiver in arbitration agreement of cable TV customers alleg-
ing antitrust violation), with Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39
(4th Cir. 2002) (holding class action waiver not preclusive of effective vindication of statu-
tory rights and not unconscionable), and Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559
(7th Cir. 2003) (finding class action waiver enforced in arbitration by borrowers against
lenders).
105. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied sub nomn, Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Gentry, 128 S. Ct. 1743 (2008).
106. Id. at 559-60.
107. Id. at 560.
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arbitration arrangement.' 8 The California Supreme Court made
several important rulings. First, the statutory wage and hour provi-
sions were not waivable.' °9 Next, the court declared that if the trial
court found "a class arbitration [] likely to be a significantly more
effective practical means of vindicating the rights of the affected
employees than individual litigation or arbitration. ... it must in-
validate the class arbitration waiver.""" Factors to consider in
making that determination included "the modest size of the poten-
tial individual recovery, the potential for retaliation against
members of the class, [and] the fact that absent members of the
class may be ill informed about their rights.""' But the court spe-
cifically held that not all class action waivers were invalid, thus
refusing to apply a per se or bright-line rule."1 Finally, the court re-
jected Circuit City's argument on the controlling importance of
the 30-day opt-out provision in negating any notion that the arbi-
tration agreement was procedurally unconscionable. 3 Regardless
of that, the nonwaivability of the statutory wage and hour rights
was held the key to resolving the validity of the class action
waiver. 14
In a case similar to Gentry, the First Circuit held a class action
waiver unconscionable under Massachusetts law as applied to an
employee alleging a violation of the overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.1 5 As in Gentry, the court emphasized that it
was not declaring all such waiver clauses invalid but was only mak-
ing a decision on the basis of the particular facts before it." 6 So
viewed, the clause subjected employees to "oppression and unfair
surprise" because "[t]he timing, the language, and the format of
the presentation of the [Dispute Resolution] Program obscured,
whether intentionally or not, the waiver of class rights. ',"7 Citing
the Supreme Court's Bazzle decision,"8 the court also stated that
the waiver question would ordinarily be for the arbitrator to de-
cide, but here the parties had agreed the court should resolve it."9
108. Id.
109. Id. at 562-63.
110. Id. at 568.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 567-68.
113. Id. at 570-71.
114. Id.
115. Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007).
116. Id. at 60.
117. Id.
118. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003).
119. Skirchak, 508 F.3d at 56.
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Some courts, like the Fifth Circuit, apparently still believe that
Supreme Court language in Gilmer calls for the routine enforce-
ment of class action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements. 2 0 It is true that parties seeking the invalidation of
these and other arbitration clauses bear the burden of proving the
provisions are unconscionable or impede the effective vindication
of statutory rights. But the trend appears to be that, given appro-
priate circumstances, that burden can be carried without too much
difficulty.
5. Fees and Costs
The Due Process Protocol required a sharing of the arbitrator's
fees by employer and employee, on the theory that the source of
payment might affect at least the appearance of the arbitrator's
neutrality.2 ' The D.C. Circuit's Cole decision repudiated that per-
ception and took the more practical position that imposing arbitral
fees and costs on employees might block their access to arbitra-
tion. 2  Since then the question has become what, if any, fees and
costs can lawfully be assessed against employees without invalidat-
ing the payment requirement or even the arbitration agreement as
a whole. In many instances, however, this issue never arises. The
employer frequently bears the entire cost of the arbitration pro-
ceedings, though usually not the employee's attorney fees or other
representational costs.
Following the Supreme Court's lead in Randolph,23 the courts
have generally placed the burden on plaintiffs to show that arbitra-
tion fees and costs are so excessive as to impair their ability to
vindicate their statutory rights. Decisions can naturally turn on
quite specific facts, depending on the dollar amounts involved and
the financial situation of individual employees. The Sixth 2 4 and
120. Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)).
121. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 62.
123. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (consumer case). See supra
text accompanying notes 78-82.
124. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668-69, 675 (6th Cir. 2003)
(finding cost-splitting provision unenforceable since it would deter substantial number of
potential claimants under federal statute but clause severable and arbitration enforceable);
Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 509-10, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating same princi-
ple on cost-splitting but clause not severable and case remanded to determine validity of
cost-splitting on facts and enforceability of arbitration).
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Ninth125 Circuits have been fairly generous to employees; the
Fourth 26 and Fifth 27 Circuits are not so favorable. These cases also
present such issues as whether one determines employees' capacity
to pay on an individual-by-individual basis or on the basis of simi-
larly situated persons, and whether an invalid arbitration clause is
severable, leaving the remainder of the arbitration agreement en-
forceable, or whether an invalid clause renders the whole
arbitration agreement unenforceable.
If the provision requiring employee payments is found invalid
but severable and arbitration is enforced, there is once again the
problem that the employer can leave the clause in the arbitration
agreement and many other employees may be deterred from seek-
ing arbitration or challenging the requirement. 8 The validity of
these and other restrictive clauses may depend on the applicability
of a specific federal or state law whose policy would be thwarted by
their enforcement. An apparent peculiarity of a cost-sharing provi-
sion, as contrasted with other common clauses discussed earlier, is
that the courts are generally more willing to assess its legitimacy
themselves and not refer the matter to the arbitrator. A modest
"tribunal fee," akin to the cost of filing a court suit, would seem
reasonable and would tend to discourage frivolous claims.
6. Limitations on Remedies
It is hard to imagine any provision in an arbitration agreement
that would seem more contrary to public policy than one prevent-
ing the full relief authorized by an applicable statute. Both the Due
Process Protocol and the Dunlop Commission specify that an arbi-
125. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1177-78, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that filing fee of $75 and cost-splitting were unconscionable and numerous uncon-
scionable clauses made arbitration unenforceable).
126. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 558 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding 50-50 arbitrator fee splitting enforceable when plaintiff did not show it impaired
his individual capacity to arbitrate, and arbitration thus enforceable).
127. Cf Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F3d 752, 763-65 (5th Cir. 1999) (stat-
ing that plaintiff failed to show that arbitral award was contrary to public policy in requiring
plaintiff to pay $3150 as his one-half share of "forum fee").
128. An analogous problem is presented when an employer asserts its willingness to pay
what would otherwise be excessive fees and costs, imposed on the employee by an arbitral
agreement, in order to secure enforcement of the arbitration provision. Compare Carter v.
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 300 (5th Cir. 2004) (allowing such employer
payment as "mooting" issue of cost-sharing's validity), with Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 3d
493, 512 (6th Cir. 2004) (refusing to sever the cost-splitting provision in the absence of a
severance clause, and pointing out that to do so would provide an incentive for other em-
ployers to leave such illegal clauses in their arbitration agreements).
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trator must have the authority to grant such a remedy.12 As Profes-
sor Malin has pointed out, however, if Judge Frank Easterbrook
and a panel of the Seventh Circuit had their way, a party could
agree to waive even a right as significant as the full statutory rem-
edy, absent an anti-waiver provision in the statute.' Judge
Easterbrook took high ground in defending his position: "One as-
pect of personal liberty is the entitlement to exchange statutory
rights for something valued more highly."'
Most courts confronting a conflict between the remedial
schemes in a statute and those in an employment arbitration
agreement have not heeded Judge Easterbrook's guidance, al-
though he does seem to find support in his own Circuit.1
2
Elsewhere a variety of paths have been followed. The Third and
Ninth Circuits have held that limitations on remedy, at least in con-
junction with other unconscionable provisions, render the
arbitration agreement unenforceable, and thus the claim must be
litigated. 3 3 Perhaps the most common approach, taken by the D.C.,
Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, is to invalidate the limitations
clause, sever it, and enforce arbitration, presumably with the arbi-
trator empowered to award the relief authorized by statute. 3 4 The
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have left the validity of the limitations
on remedy to the arbitrator in the first instance.
3
The very foundation of Gilmer's sustaining the enforceability of a
mandatory arbitration clause was that it merely represented
a change of forums and not a loss of substantive statutory rights.
3 6
It might well be that in other contexts, where one party in an equal
bargaining relationship decides to forgo certain statutory entitle-
ments to obtain a more valued return, the Judge Easterbrook
reasoning would make sense. But when a compelled arbitration
clause is coupled with a compelled surrender of statutory rights,
the rationale for upholding mandatory arbitration clauses
129. See supra text accompanying note 61.
130. Malin, supra note 71, at 393-94.
131. See Metro East Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 294
F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 2002) (consumer case).
132. See Baravati v.Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
133. Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 267, 271 (3d Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2003).
134. Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 E3d 77, 83, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Spinetti v.
Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 E3d 212, 217, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2003); Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474,
478 (5th Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 670-75 (6th Cir.
2003).
135. Cannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F3d 677, 681 n.6 (8th Cir. 2001); Summers
v. Dillards, Inc., 351 E3d 1100, 1101 (11th Cir. 2003).
136. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
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collapses. The harder questions are what exactly should then be
done, and who should decide.
I am not much troubled when a court decides to pay attention
to all the facts of a case in making those determinations. For ex-
ample, if an arbitration agreement is riddled by unconscionable
clauses, not just a limitation on remedies, one could conclude that
an employer has made such a mockery of the process that the ap-
propriate response is for the court to void the whole arbitral
arrangement and proceed to handle the entire case itself. On the
other hand, if the challenged clause simply precludes punitive
damages (the common practice in contract disputes in arbitrations
between unions and employers) and is invalidated because one
applicable statute authorizes such damages, it may be reasonable to
sever that provision and enforce arbitration. But I do not under-
stand the reason for letting arbitrators decide the validity of the
limitations clause (unless it is no more than determining the
meaning of the provision). If ever there was a situation calling for a
bright-line rule, this would seem to be it. An arbitrator must be
empowered to provide all the remedies available under applicable
law, and any purported contractual diminution of that authority is
null and void.
CONCLUSION
From my own research and experience, and from the three pa-
pers I have discussed by Professors Bales, Colvin, and Malin that
were presented at the National Academy of Arbitrators conference
in the spring of 2007, I draw three principal lessons. 37 First, at least
as far as mandatory arbitration in employment is concerned, it is
time to stop talking about the theoretical deprivation of statutory
procedures and to recognize the realities of the working world.
The vast majority of ordinary, lower- and middle-income employees
(essentially, those making less than $60,000 a year) cannot get ac-
cess to the courts to vindicate their contractual and statutory rights.
Most lawyers will not find their cases worth the time and expense.
Their only practical hope is the generally cheaper, faster, and more
informal process of arbitration. If that is so-called mandatory arbi-
tration, so be it. There is no viable alternative.
137. See Bales, supra note 70; Colvin, supra note 35; Malin, supra note 71. Naturally, I do
not claim that these three authors would necessarily agree with any of my conclusions. But I
am much indebted to their research and analysis, and I apologize for any misuse they may
feel I have made of it.
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A great deal of debate still rages about the respective success
rates of employees who have arbitrated claims against employers
and those who have been fortunate enough to get into court to
pursue their claims. I am prepared to concede that some of the
early studies were overly optimistic about the chances of rank-and-
file employees in arbitration. Apparently the initial surveys did not
adequately distinguish between those employees, usually relying on
'just cause" policies in personnel manuals, and professional and
executive employees with individualized contracts of employment.
The latter were significantly more successful. Nonetheless, my sec-
ond lesson is that even the more refined recent studies show that
lower-paid employees still had quite respectable success rates in
arbitration, ranging from about 21% to almost 40%. That com-
pares very favorably with the 23% win rate of union-represented
employees that I found in one of the oldest and most respected
labor arbitration systems in the country. So, employees subject to
mandatory arbitration not only have access to relief that otherwise
would seldom be available; the system works for them. A final point
is that the great majority of these arbitrated cases do not involve
statutory claims at all. They are contractually based on employee
handbooks and the like. The substitution of an arbitral forum for a
judicial forum in enforcing statutory rights is relatively infrequent.
The third and final lesson I would derive from all these studies is
that the true challenge is to ensure due process in employment
arbitration. Professors Bales and Malin both stress the need, in
light of the perceived deficiencies in judicial supervision, for more
self-regulation by employers, arbitrators, and arbitrator providers
like the American Arbitration Association and JAMS.13s Bales would
try to amend and update the Due Process Protocol, despite the
skepticism of its most influential proponent, Arnold Zack, that the
Protocol was the product of a special historical moment that can-
not be replicated. Malin urges the adoption of such standards as
the National Academy of Arbitrators' Guidelines for Employment
Arbitration, and adherence to them by employers, arbitrators, and
designating agencies. Malin also deplores the retreat by the courts
from clear, bright-line rules in the application of due process stan-
dards. On this latter score I am of two minds. I would applaud the
voluntary adoption of bright-line regulations by the various par-
ticipating parties in the arbitration process. But when it comes to
the courts, wielding the power of the state, I find more congenial
the nuanced approach of case-by-case adjudication. As can be seen
138. Bales, supra note 70, at 340-43; Malin, supra note 71, at 396-403.
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from the earlier discussion of various types of clauses in arbitration
agreements, the provisions themselves can differ greatly and so can
the situations in which they are applied. In fairness to all parties, I
feel they deserve discriminating assessments of their own particular
circumstances. For example, I could imagine limitations on class
actions in certain situations which I would consider reasonable.
But an absolute prohibition of limitations on statutory remedies
seems appropriate. 39
Overall, my conclusion is that, whatever may be the contrary ap-
peal of the siren song of perfection, mandatory arbitration is
indeed better than it looks. For the lower-paid, nonunion em-
ployee it may be the only realistic recourse.
139. I distinguish that from limitations on purely contractual remedies.
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